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ABSTRACT: We propose a universal definition of intelligence of a physical system and discuss its 
implications on design of intelligent systems. The definition proposed is universally valid and does 
not invoke teleological or anthropic concepts. We discuss the relationship of intelligence to 
energetic properties by invoking recent results in inequilibrium thermodynamics and 
computational mechanics. Intelligent system design is reformulated in three natural problems: 
selective forgetting, memory maintenance and self-recording. We conclude with highlighting the 
relationship of energetic and informational optimality principles involved in designing intelligent 
physical systems or their spontaneous emergence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in the era of yet another technological revolution. If the previous one was 
associated with the development of energy conversion tools to produce work, harnessing 
increasingly vast resources over the course of history, the world nowadays is being rapidly 
transformed by the information processing tools. Starting with arithmetic devices that 
support conditional clauses and store intermediate results, we have arrived at machines 
emulating major functions that have before typically been attributed only to living beings 
or specifically to humans — learning, knowledge management, pattern recognition and 
control. The source of hopes and fears these days is being called «artificial intelligence», 
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potentially dramatically enhancing the life conditions for humans and at the same time 
outcompeting us in the labor market. There is also quite an amount of speculation and 
research concerning theoretically possible super-intelligences posing existential risk for 
our species, and whether it is possible to align their interests with ours. Despite the 
massive effort in the field, the big question remains standing in the background: What is 
intelligence? 
There have been numerous attempts at defining intelligence. In those proposals, the 
concept of intelligence often involves at least two distinct notions — one concerning the 
performance of an entity in a given fixed environment, and another one concerning its 
ability to learn new environments. The emphasis depends on the preferences of 
individual authors. It is also notable that these definitional inherently teleological, 
describing the intelligent entity as having a goal or receiving rewards. The most elegant 
and general definition [1] is as well set in the framework of reinforcement learning and 
involves uncomputable universal probability distribution which precludes its practical 
use. 
The notion of intelligence in a system is strongly associated with its information 
processing architecture [2,3]. Luckily, information is a well-defined property of a signal. 
Moreover, since the advent of information era, a number of connections were 
established, relating information theory  to statistical physics and thermodynamics. By 
now the energy-information duality is fundamental to our understanding of organization 
in complex systems and emergence of functionality. Intelligence is a functional property 
of systems, therefore it is supposed to have complementary energetic and informational 
descriptions. Using the connection between information theory and physics provided by 
computational mechanics, the question of intelligence becomes physically tractable. 
In this paper we propose a universal definition of intelligence for a physical system 
and discuss its implications on design of intelligent systems. 
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
We want our definition of intelligence to have certain properties: 
 
1. Physical: intelligence is well-defined in terms of physical observables of the 
system. 
2. Universal: the definition should be applicable to any realizable physical system 
without referring to anthropic metaphors (e.g. goals or rewards) or particularities 
of the realization. 
3. Observable: intelligence of an entity should be in principle observable by the third 
parties. 
4. Practical: intelligence of an entity should be determinable in finite time using only 
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the observation of its behavior. Note that the word behavior here is used in a 
more general sense than its traditional use in psychology, and refers to the path 
of system in its configuration space as it evolves in spacetime, or some coarse-
grained version of it that can be obtained from measurement. 
5. Partial order: we want to be able to compare intelligences of different systems, 
grading them as more or less intelligent. 
6. Causal: intelligence of an entity should depend only on the regions of spacetime 
causally accessible from it. 
7. Object-agnostic: intelligence should be defined for any non-pathological 4-
dimensional open manifold in spacetime. 
8. Instantaneous: intelligence should be a pointwise property, manifesting at a given 
event in spacetime. 
9. Boundary-dependent: intelligence at a given point should be a property of the 
boundaries defining an entity and not only the point of evaluation. It 
corresponds to the intuition that intelligence of a single bee is different then the 
intelligence of the bee hive, even if the evaluation of the latter occurs in a 
measurement of a behavior of a particular bee. 
10. Useful: the usage of the term «intelligence» should correspond to it current usage 
in language, referring to intelligent living beings and artificial intelligence. 
11. Objective: intelligence should not depend on any subjective criteria. 
 
We adopt the macro scale view of the phenomena, using relativistic spacetime as the 
background. This also allows us to use thermodynamics, and connect it to statistical 
mechanical description of the dynamical systems present in the object. Within the 
statistical paradigm, the connection to information theory arises, which allows us to 
discuss information processing properties of the system and its computational ability in 
relation to intelligence [4-10]. The definition we construct in the next two sections 
satisfies all of the properties proposed here. 
III. DEFINING THE ENTITY AND CAUSAL PATHWAYS 
Consider an open connected 4-dimensional manifold M the closure of which is compact. 
Suppose M is embedded in Minkowski spacetime and represents the region that encloses 
(and defines) the entity the intelligence of which is being evaluated. We also require that 
M admits a 1-dimesional worldline L that is time-like at every point and has continuous 
intersection with M, i.e. 𝛕𝛕(L∩M) = (𝛕𝛕min, 𝛕𝛕max) in any proper time parametrization 𝛕𝛕: 
L→ℝ diffeomorphic to the real line and oriented from past to the future. We set 𝛕𝛕min = 0 
to simplify further notation. To avoid pathological cases, assume that intersection of L 
with the boundary of M is transversal. We refer to the two points 
of L∩𝜕𝜕M as birth and death, since a point in four-dimensional  
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spacetime corresponds to an event.  A worldline L satisfying the above conditions with 
respect to M will be called a lifeline in M. 
We identify the worldline with a path taken by an observer, which is a point-like entity 
able to receive, store manipulate and record information. Our observer is rather special 
in that it only receives signals that originate in M. The recording of information and its 
processing occurs in internal state of the observer. Since observer is defined in purely 
geometric and computational terms, we interpret the internal state of the observer to be 
the state of a spacetime element, describing its position in the available configuration 
space (e.g. intensity spectrum of EM field, contents of various distinct species, 
temperature, etc). We denote the state of a spacetime element at event x as S(x). 
At each point x ∈ L, let us denote the time-like region of past as TPL(x), time-like 
region of future as TFL(x) and the 4-dimensional ball of radius t as B(x, t). The boundary 
of the ball in Minkowski metric corresponds to a two-sheet hyperboloid, with its 
components lying in TPL(x) and TFL(x) respectively [see Figure 1]. 
Figure 1. Two-dimensional cut of the space-time diagram of an entity M with observer 
worldline L, representing instantaneous causal structure at x. For illustrative purposes we 
assumed that L is a subset of the cut. 
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We define the causal M-past at x along L as a union of all intersections of time-like 
regions of past over points of L∩M up to x:    
 
PM (L, x) := ⋃t∈(0, 𝛕𝛕(x)) [TPL (y) ∩ B(y, t) ∩ M] = M ∩ (⋃t∈(0, 𝛕𝛕(x)) [TPL (y) ∩ 
B(y, t)]),     
where y is a point in L with 𝛕𝛕(y) = t. 
 
The causal M-past is empty at and before birth: PM(L, xbirth) = ∅. In English, the birth 
event of an observer of the entity M is independent of any part of M. The locus of the 
worldline between birth and any x ∈ L∩M is always contained in the causal M-past at x, 
reflecting the intuition that an observer moving along L is always able to be influenced 
by its own past, independently of the choice of entity M. Note that PM (L, x) ⊂ PM (L, y) for 
any points x, y ∈ L with  𝛕𝛕(x)≤𝛕𝛕(y). This reflects that an observer at later proper times is 
influenced by at least the events that she was influenced with before. 
 
Analogously, we define the causal M-future at x along L: 
FM (L, x) := ⋃t∈(𝛕𝛕(x), 𝛕𝛕d) [TFL (y) ∩ B(y, 𝛕𝛕d-t) ∩ M] = M ∩ (⋃t∈(0, 𝛕𝛕(x)) [TFL (y) 
∩ B(y, 𝛕𝛕d-t)]),     
where y is a point in L with 𝛕𝛕(y) = t, and 𝛕𝛕d = 𝛕𝛕(xdeath). 
 
The set of events FM (L, x) represents the events in M that the observer at x can 
influence over the course of its lifetime after x. The locus of the worldline between  any x 
∈ L∩M and death is always contained in the causal M-future at x, reflecting the intuition 
that an observer moving along L is always able to influence its own future till its death, 
independently of the choice of entity M. Note that causal M-future is empty at and after 
death: FM(L, xdeath) = ∅. Note that FM (L, x) ⊂ FM (L, y) for any points x, y ∈ L with  
𝛕𝛕(y)≤𝛕𝛕(x). In other words, the causal future of points further on the worldline is contained 
in the future of earlier points. 
To summarize, we consider the observer to travel along L, with internal clock 
counting proper time 𝛕𝛕. It receives signals from some events in PM(L, x), processes them 
and sends signals to some events in FM (L, x). Therefore an observer at x is able to operate 
at most with the information that is contained in PM(L, x), and is able to influence at most 
the information that is (or will be, if a dynamic view is adopted) contained in FM (L, x). 
IV. DEFINING INTELLIGENCE 
We want the intelligence of M to be defined it terms of prediction capability of the most 
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predictive observer worldline L accommodated by M. We would say that the quality of 
prediction is quantified by two features: how well does the observer know the future, and 
how far into the future can it look ahead. Also we suggest that «irrational knowledge» 
should not be considered intelligent. In more rigorous terms, we only consider the 
predictive information that observer has regarding the signals that she is potentially able 
to interact with later and compare with its predictions.  
It suffices to require the intelligent system to be able to predict the events that happen on its 
boundary. The reason for this choice is motivated by the current usage of the world when 
referring to living beings or artificial computational machines. As the system M is 4-
dimensional, its boundary 𝜕𝜕M is 3-dimensional. Hence the intersection of 𝜕𝜕M with the 
hyperplane HL(x) of events simultaneous with x ∈ L in L-observer frame is 2-dimensional 
almost everywhere. For natural intelligence of living beings, this geometric object 
corresponds to instantaneous (constant L-time slice) positions of the sensory input 
surfaces, e.g. retina, eardrum, skin, at smaller scales - membranes of individual sensory 
neurons. For silicon-based artificial intelligence, the surfaces at question are the cross-
sections of the wires providing the input streams into CPU-RAM complex.  
We advocate for the extreme epistemic philosophical standpoint, suggesting that the 
intelligent models of reality do not even in principle need to represent the ontological 
state of reality. On the contrary, intelligent beings only need to be able to maintain a 
model that allows them to predict the future of their interactions with their immediate 
environments. Such model is not explicitly required to be representative of potentially 
existing objective reality. 
The particular property that we attribute intelligence to is shortcut processing — 
intuitively, we will say that a system is intelligent if and only if it constructs a good 
predictive model of what will happen to it before it actually happens. In more rigorous 
terms, the measure of intelligence of a system is how much information does it contain 
about what will happen to its boundary over the remaining course of its lifetime.  
Consider an observer at point x ∈ L. In its future at point y ∈ L : 𝛕𝛕(x)≤𝛕𝛕(y), it will 
receive signals from some subset of PM (L, y)\ PM (L, x). Replacing M with the boundary 
of M in the definition of causal M-past, we obtain the causal past interface increase between x 
and y:  
 
CPIM,L(x,y) := ⋃t∈(𝛕𝛕(x), 𝛕𝛕(y)) [TPL (z) ∩ B(z, t) ∩ 𝜕𝜕M],  where 𝛕𝛕(z) = t. 
 
We want to establish how much does the observer know about its future while at x. 
The rigorous way is to calculate the mutual information I( S(x);  S(CPIM,L(y, z)) ) between 
the state of the observer  at x and the state of the (3-dimensional) boundary that the 
observer will be receiving signals from as it traverses L from y to z. Then we can 
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differentiate the above quantity with respect to z and obtain boundary information density 
BID(x; y) along L. This quantity tells us how predictive is the observer state at x of the 
signals that will happen to it upon infinitesimal proper time period starting at point y. To 
obtain the intelligent information the observer has regarding all of the future, this density 
should be integrated: 
 
II (M, L, x) := I ( S(x); S(CPIM,L(x, xdeath)) ) = ∫y∈(x, xdeath) BID(x; y) dy 
  
The last step in formally defining intelligence of entity M at event x is finding the 
worldline that satisfies the constraints of section III and maximizes intelligent 
information defined above: 
 
Intelligence (M, x) := sup{L - lifelines in M | x ∈ L } II (M, L, x) 
 
This definition satisfies all of the constraints proposed in section II by construction. 
However, the calculations to perform are not straightforward. In the next section we try 
to make the procedure more explicit. 
V. PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE MEASUREMENT 
The procedure outline in section IV involves calculating the mutual information between 
the state of an observer at a fixed point in spacetime and the compound state of the 
causal past interface increase between two points in the future. How can this be done? 
In general, the performance of the measurements with necessary precision can be 
impossible without destroying the dynamical order in the system. Therefore the 
suggested use of the definition is for dynamical systems that can be converted into 
symbolic systems by choosing a proper state space partition. This would allow for an ε-
machine reconstruction, which can be used to produce distributions identical to those 
generated by continuous dynamics in actual system, yet by performing symbolic 
manipulations. Hence in its current state the calculation of intelligence of a system 
requires to be able to reproduce its dynamics as optimally as possible.[4,19,24] 
VI. ENERGETIC CONSIDERATIONS 
We propose a view that learning capability is not a prerequisite of intelligence, but the 
other way around. Intelligence, as defined by prediction capability, implies that observer 
is able to select which information out of the input stream reaching it should be 
discarded and when it should be discarded in order for predictive information to arise — 
given energy constraints. Here we discuss the problem of intelligence in the universe 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 120 
from the design perspective: i.e., what conditions shall be true for a given system to 
ensure its large intelligence? 
Recently the connection between thermodynamics and prediction capacity has been 
established firmly [20-25]. The memory of the environment’s past by the system (mutual 
information between system present and environment past) should not be much larger 
compared to the predictive power of the system (mutual information between system 
present and environment future) in order to minimize work dissipation. The «useless 
nostalgia» is proportional to average work being dissipated instantaneously, and is a 
lower bound on total work dissipated over lifetime. Even more fundamentally, the 
Landauer’s principle is modified by «nostalgia»: it appears as a new term in the lower 
bound for heat released. Inferential model with low efficiency (i.e. high «nostalgia») can 
not be made energy efficient. Maximally energy-efficient functional system (with 
memory) has to be predictive and not nostalgic. 
Therefore we suggest three natural problems arising in design of intelligent systems. 
1) Selective forgetting: out of all data received by the system, how do the system 
dynamics figure out which parts shall be forgotten due to uselessness, and which shall be 
retained?  
2) Memory maintenance: out of all data maintained by the system, how do the system 
dynamics figure out which parts to forget and when?  
3) Self-recording: out of all data sent by the system, how do the system dynamics 
figure out which parts shall it record itself for future reference? 
Note that forgetting costs dissipation bounded from below by sum of how much 
nostalgia does the system currently contains, so for low dissipation it is best to forget 
when non-predictive information is already low. In other words, if a system has learnt the 
skill of selective forgetting well in the past, it will make it a better learner in the future. 
In Landauer bound, forgetting refers to self-information of the system, not mutual 
information with environment. Hence increase in variability of one’s internal state also 
counts as forgetting. But it can be beneficial for an agent, and potentially increase its 
predictive capability. Hence an agent wants to have that capacity —  preferably in an 
efficient manner. Energetic cost of the process is bounded from below by increase in self-
information plus current nostalgia. Therefore to be good at increasing your entropy 
(Landauer’s forgetting), you need to be minimally nostalgic. 
Note that for a piece of data stored, a highly intelligent system would store it in the 
form that is the most convenient, given the estimated lifetime till erasure. Therefore 
intelligent system also contains information on its own future behavior, thus explicitly 
exhibiting reflexivity. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have constructed a definition of intelligence for a physically instantiated system and 
provided a roadmap to practical calculations of intelligence in dynamical systems. 
Connecting information theory to thermodynamics, we discuss the relationship of 
optimality principles constraining the design of intelligent systems. 
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